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ABSTRACT
Insurance profits in non-life insurance markets display a large fluc-
tuation that may make it hard for insurance companies to control
their operating volatility. By taking into account asymmetries in
dynamics of insurance profits, this paper provides empirical evi-
dence of the visualised cycles in insurance markets and relevant
underwriting strategies of insurance companies. The results hint
at the possible existence of overconfidence in underwriting activ-
ities when the underwriting result turns bad. Compared with the
whole insurance industry, insurance companies engage more
speculative behaviour in underwriting activities on the general
liability insurance. For regulation purposes, the government
should maintain more disciplined underwriting policies of insur-
ance companies in different insurance lines in order to avoid
irrational pricing strategies and improve the economic efficiency
of insurance supply.
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The dynamics of insurance profits in non-life insurance markets has long been
known by insurance practitioners and academics as the underwriting cycle in which a
so-called hard and soft markets follow each other. In a period of soft market, a
relaxed underwriting policy makes insurance coverage readily available and insurance
profits fall, whereas in the subsequent hard market the underwriting policy is tight-
ened, which causes difficulty in obtaining coverage and increasing insurance profits.
According to the Barron’s Dictionary of Insurance Terms (Rubin, 2008), ‘underwriting
cycle’ is defined as ‘a tendency of property and liability insurance premiums, insurers’
profits, and availability of coverage to rise and fall with some regularity over time’.
Such uncontrollable cycles have a crucial impact on insurance operations, which
results in unpredictable earnings streams for insurance companies and unsatisfactory
performance for their investors. The pricing decisions of actuaries and underwriters
in insurance companies are forced to respond to such market cycles. In particular,
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soft markets might contribute to insolvency problems if insurance companies under-
write too aggressively, whereas hard markets might disrupt the distribution of insur-
ance products due to stringent underwriting policies. Not only primary insurance
markets, but also worldwide reinsurance markets are subject to price and the avail-
ability cycle (Cummins, 2005; Cummins & Weiss, 2009). In practice, regulators and
practitioners have to contend with a major unknown: the timing and magnitude of
the next hard/soft markets. Without clear and regular cycle patterns, it is more diffi-
cult for insurance companies to process their pricing and reserving functions.
Modelling or predicting such fluctuations, which may help insurance companies to
control their operating volatility, has traditionally been viewed as the greatest chal-
lenge for executives and practitioners (Lloyds, 2007).
There is much debate as to the behaviour of insurance companies dealing with
whether they are rational or not. In a perfect market with rational expectations,
insurance pricing reflects only the discounted value of future cash flow associated
with losses and relevant expenses. Such a view assumes insurance companies are risk
neutral and capital markets are perfect, which means that insurance companies could
adjust their surplus quickly to eliminate their insolvency risk. Accordingly, any unex-
pected changes in interest rates may cause the fluctuation of underwriting profits.
However, there is no proof that interest rates themselves display a cyclical behaviour,
thus a pure rational expectation framework may not be adequate for explaining such
wide and puzzling swings in insurance markets. An adjusted version, the rational
expectations/institutional intervention hypothesis (Cummins & Outreville, 1987),
attributes such cyclical patterns to institutional lags of the insurance industry, such as
data collection lags, regulatory lags and financial reporting lags. For instance, the
prior approval rating system that requires insurance companies to file beforehand for
rate changes creates an increased variability in underwriting profits by delaying the
rapid adjustment of prices to new information, thus rational acts of insurance compa-
nies may look as if they are irrational. Accordingly, the underwriting cycle is consid-
ered as endogenous and a second-order autoregressive process with the cyclical
assumptions1 is utilised extensively to model the dynamics of insurance profits.
However, recent studies show that there is really no statistical basis to support such a
second-order autoregressive type of underwriting cycle in the insurance industry (e.g.,
Boyer, Jacquier, & Norden, 2012). Therefore, the presence of cycles in insurance mar-
kets remains an open question.
Another famous school of thought is relevant to industry capacity. Capacity gener-
ally refers to the degree that the whole industry provides insurance coverage without
increasing the level of insolvency risk. Berger (1988) mentions that an insurance com-
pany is assumed to set its underwriting policy and insurance price for the upcoming
year on the basis of current capacity. The capacity constraint hypothesis (Winter,
1994) emphasises a special feature of the above theory. It suggests that insurance
companies could not immediately freely restore capacity from costly external capital
when their surplus is reduced by unpredictable shocks. The underwriting cycle is
attributable to temporary market imperfections, which means that raising insurance
profits becomes a way of adjusting capacity after a reduction in surplus due to unex-
pected loss, such as industry-wide catastrophes, unanticipated changes in liability
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rules or shortfall in investment returns. For instance, prominent hard markets were
triggered by Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the World Trade Center terrorist attack
in 2001 (Cummins, 2007). Apparently, the capacity constraint hypothesis focuses
mainly on the hard market, which is triggered by external negative shocks to capacity.
On the other hand, the insurance price in soft markets should be equal to those
implied by the perfect markets model because of the slack capacity during that
period. Empirical evidence on the capacity constraint hypothesis, however, is some-
what mixed and inconclusive, especially for general liability insurance (e.g., Cummins
& Danzon, 1997; Gron, 1994). Some aberrant behaviour of insurance companies has
also been evidenced during soft markets, which is beyond expectations (e.g.,
Harrington, Danzon, & Epstein, 2008). In fact, there are still many mysteries about
insurance cycles that deserve attention, both theoretically and empirically
(Weiss, 2007).
From practitioners’ view, in order to fulfil company objectives, insurance compa-
nies formulate their underwriting policy to decide insurance price, quantity of supply
and standards of risk selections for the upcoming year according to relevant factors
such as their past loss experience, regulations and current capacity. The greater the
industry capacity means the greater the ability of insurance companies to write busi-
ness. That underwriting policy may vary each year results in insurance profits (i.e.,
loss ratios or combined ratios) moving in cyclical patterns, or spikes and crashes in
insurance markets. However, the insurance supply can change quickly and drastically,
and is as psychological as it is financial (Stewart, 1984). Practitioners tend to explain
such variations of the underwriting policy by extensively competitive forces, that is,
in order to gain or maintain markets shares, some companies will engage in irrational
behaviour to offer more insurance at prices far below expectations. Owing to inten-
sive competition, many companies will follow this behaviour until a correction occurs
in the whole industry. They then over-reduce supply and increase price, waiting for
the next round of destructive competition to arrive. Based on this narrative, Feldblum
(2007) concludes that the market structure of insurance is always in a state of perpet-
ual disequilibrium with continuing price oscillations. Tetin (2016) also noted that
shifts in loss ratios are caused by dynamics of competition in the insurance market.
Ligon and Thistle (2007) also suggest that insurance profits change should be asym-
metrical and displayed as a cycle.
A considerable number of empirical studies have been carried out on this context
for more than two decades. Most studies have focused on short-term determination
of insurance profits by using conventional regressions; relatively fewer articles have
used cointegration analysis to find out the long-term determination (e.g., Haley,
1993). A major reason why the equilibrium relationship is difficult to reveal might be
that the time series characteristic of insurance profits, measured by combined ratio or
loss ratio, is still not totally revealed. Insurance profits might be demonstrated as sta-
tionary (e.g., Choi, Hardigree, & Thistle, 2002; Harrington & Yu, 2003), while rele-
vant regressors, such as interest rate, might be treated as non-stationary.
Cointegration is constrained to being conducted under Johansen’s VECM framework,
which requires underlying variables to be integrated of the same order. If insurance
profits were stationary, inclusion of any non-stationary regressors would make the
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cointegration analysis inappropriate. By contrast, Haley (2007) points out that finding
a unit root is a sufficient but not necessary condition while evaluating the dynamics
of insurance profits. He also argues that controlling for a time trend when conducting
unit root test may not be appropriate. Without the necessity for testing unit roots,
Jiang and Nieh (2012) provide evidence of the level relationship between interest rate,
industry capacity and insurance profits in the U.S. insurance market at the whole
industry level. In sum, empirical results of previous studies imply that in order to
understand more underwriting activities of insurance companies, efforts have to be
made to develop a robust empirical model without requiring firm knowledge of the
time series characteristics of underlying variables. This paper tries to fill this gap
using recent advances in the field of time series modelling.
Compared with the existing literature, this study extends previous research and
contributes to the literature in several ways. First, by utilising more robust methodol-
ogies, the arguments of stationary features of insurance profits (e.g., Haley, 2007;
Harrington & Yu, 2003) could be avoided without examining whether underlying var-
iables possess unit roots. Results of this study show that there are two different
regimes to portray underwriting activities, which reflect different beliefs of insurance
companies during different periods. A visible cyclical pattern of insurance profits
could be explained as a feedback tendency to the equilibrium, rather than modelling
as an AR(2) process with cyclical assumptions. Second, the data-generating process of
methodologies utilised in this study, the bounds testing procedure (Pesaran, Shin, &
Smith, 2001) and the ADL test for threshold cointegration (Li & Lee, 2010) are both
based on a single-equation autoregressive process and could provide both short- and
long-term implications of insurance profits simultaneously. These types of cointegra-
tion test are referred to as ADL tests (Ericsson & Mackinnon, 2002), which differ
from the existing tests using the Engle and Granger (1987) type testing regression or
the error correction model. An ADL test does not test the significance of the coeffi-
cient of the cointegrating vector and cointegrating residuals, and could provide more
robust results (see Rao, 2007, for a review). Moreover, families of the autoregressive
process are traditionally constructed to portray the dynamics of underwriting profits,2
thus are indeed appropriate in this context. Third, we do not use pre-specified peri-
ods of hard/soft markets but employ the percentile of error corrections to indicate
alternative regimes, which makes our argument more robust. This study shows that
as the underwriting result turns worse, far from expectations, the underwriting policy
becomes more aggressive on risk taking for the next period. Finally, the results allow
us to investigate the slowness of the adjustment process by accounting for the poten-
tial aforementioned non-linearities. The standard cointegration models may be poor
for accounting for the full dynamics of the adjustment process of underwriting profits
since they implicitly assume that: (i) the adjustment speed towards equilibrium is
both continuous and constant, regardless of the extent of the real misalignment; and
(ii) any deviation from the equilibrium level is temporary to ensure quickly mean-
reverting dynamics. In our context, the fact that underwriting profits spend long peri-
ods away from their equilibrium could be explained by non-linearities due to hetero-
geneity information across insurance companies (Ligon & Thistle, 2007), or by
whether their capacity is restricted or not (Higgins & Thistle, 2000). To the best of
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our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to adopt asymmetrical threshold cointe-
gration techniques to provide empirical evidence about the underwriting strategy of
insurance companies.
2. Data
In this article, the loss ratio and the combined ratio are utilised as measures of non-life
insurance underwriting profits of a given year.3 Both are practically and traditionally
employed as profit measures for evaluating purposes in the insurance industry. This
article applies annual U.S. insurance industry data during the period 1956–2016 from
Best’s Aggregates and Averages, published by A.M. Best Company. Specifically, this art-
icle investigates not only the whole non-life insurance industry (all lines combined),
but also general liability insurance,4 which is traditionally considered as a ‘long-tail’
business. The ‘tail’ of an insurance line means the time between the accident event and
actual compensation pay-off. The general liability insurance, which can extend over
several years to the settlement, is conventionally viewed as risky lines that increase the
risk of large errors in forecasting ultimate claims both in payment time and dollar
amount. Since the general liability insurance has a larger proportion of claims out-
standing, it should be the most capacity-affected line during the financial crisis, and be
more sensitive to fluctuations in interest rates because they have much more time to be
invested. Figure 1 is a plot of both times series of the U.S. insurance industry-wide
combined ratios. As displayed in Figure 1, they may exhibit similar fluctuating behav-
iour but not necessarily to the same degree. Not really a regular cycle with a predict-
able pattern, they seem to be a result of a dynamic system with slow adjustment and
possibly inadequate damping. There seem to be some non-linear or asymmetric adjust-
ment patterns exhibited in the figure. Moreover, the general liability insurance line
Figure 1. The U.S. insurance industry-wide combined ratios. Source: Best’s Aggregates and
Averages, published by A. M. Best Company.
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shows an extremely large cycle of combined ratio during the 1980s, the well-known
liability crisis in the U.S., with unavailability and unaffordability of liability insurance
that caused many failures of institutions. It is the most famous example of a ‘hard mar-
ket’ or ‘insurance crisis’ in the history of insurance in the U.S.
Traditionally, industry capacity is defined as the amount of business insurance
industry is able to write and is based on insurance companies’ written premiums to
their surplus (Webb, Harrison, & Markham, 2002). Surplus provides a cushion for
unexpected, negative claims outcomes if insurance companies do not have sufficient
funds to pay claims. This article utilises industry capacity ct as the ratio of lagged
aggregate policyholders’ surplus to lagged net written premiums. Such a ratio is the
inverse version of the well-known Kenney ratio, which is traditionally used as a rule-
of-thumb measure for evaluation purposes and regulation concerns.5 This proxy of
capacity has also been utilised by previous underwriting cycles studies (e.g., Choi
et al., 2002). The policyholders’ lagged surplus, which reflects insurers’ capacity at the
beginning of a new period, is reported at the end of the previous year from Best’s
Aggregates and Averages. The net written premiums represent the company’s exposure
during that period, and therefore could capture all of the factors that determine the
overall financial risk of the insurance company. Moreover, this article utilises industry
investment income ratio IIRt as the measure of investment performance of the insur-
ance industry. This ratio, which relates net investment income to earned premium, is
traditionally used for regulation purposes and is contained in the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC) Insurance Regulatory Information
System (IRIS). Finally, the one-year Treasury constant maturity rate, which is col-
lected from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, is employed as the interest rates proxy in
our study.
Table 1 represents the descriptive statistics and the results of unit root tests of rele-
vant variables in this study. The ADF test and PP test statistics suggest that all















Mean 74.1393 102.0393 81.1576 109.5173 5.0792 0.9620 10.2411
Maximum 88.7000 116.1000 127.9469 153.2603 14.7706 1.7251 15.4200
Minimum 63.0000 91.8000 51.3700 87.4100 0.1200 0.4628 4.8847
Standard deviation 6.7441 5.5799 17.9538 15.0855 3.2411 0.3628 3.6623
Skewness 0.3041 0.6275 0.4797 0.9319 0.5860 0.7414 0.1369
Kurtosis 2.3393 2.8716 2.8255 3.4278 3.3601 2.3418 1.5472
Jarque–Bera Statistic 2.0496 4.0453 2.4166 9.2941 3.8208 6.6897 5.7367
ADF test (levels) 2.6255 3.0036 2.4866 2.9277 1.4096 0.4440 1.5843
ADF test (first difference) 7.6238 7.2655 6.3070 6.4431 6.2460 6.1627 5.1699
PP test (levels) 2.5662 3.1169 2.3670 2.7484 1.4330 0.1649 1.5253
PP test (first difference) 9.1932 8.6244 6.2855 6.4151 5.8631 6.1627 5.1655
KPSS test (levels) 0.4555 0.3010 0.3699 0.2798 0.3457 0.6994 0.6290
KPSS test (first difference) 0.2976 0.1481 0.0884 0.0515 0.2635 0.2761 0.3462
Source: authors’ calculations.
PP¼ Phillips and Perron unit root test with H0: variables are of I(1); KPSS¼ Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin
unit root test with H0: variables are of I(0).Significant at the 5% level.
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variables are I(1) except for combined ratio in the whole insurance industry. KPSS
test statistics, however, suggest only industry capacity and investment income ratio
are I(1). The overall unit root test results demonstrate the inconsistency in the inte-
gration order of variables in question and support the use of the bounds testing
approach for the subsequent empirical analysis.
3. Methodology
We are interested in the relationship between underwriting profits (i.e., measured by
loss ratios or combined ratios), interest rates, investment income ratio and industry
capacity. Evidence has shown that interest rates and loss ratios are cointegrated (e.g.,
Choi et al., 2002; Haley, 1993). On the other hand, an insurance company is assumed
to set its underwriting policy for the upcoming year on the basis of current capacity
(e.g., Berger, 1988). Jiang and Nieh (2012) propose a more robust empirical method-
ology and provide evidence of the level relationship between interest rates, the cap-
acity proxy and underwriting profits in the U.S. insurance market at whole industry
level. Moreover, two crucial business activities of insurance companies, underwriting
and investment, may be related to each other (e.g., Ellis, 1990; Zou et al., 2012).
Therefore, we consider the following econometric specification at time t:
yt ¼ a0 þ a1rt þ a2ct þ a3IIRt þ ut (1)
where yt , rt, ct and IIRt denote the measures of underwriting profits (i.e., measured
by loss ratio or combined ratio), interest rates, the insurers’ capacity proxy and
investment income ratio, respectively. a is the estimated parameter and ut is the equi-
librium correction term. We expect the estimated slope parameter, a1, to be positive,
since an increase in interest rates should also lead to an increase in loss ratios and
combined ratios due to the fact the insurance price is charged based on discounted
loss paid. The estimated slope parameter of the industry capacity, a2, is also expected
to be positive, since an appreciation of capacity causes companies to have more confi-
dence to write more business and hence leads to an increase in loss ratios and com-
bined ratios.
Equation (1) implies that there is a level long-run relationship between underwrit-
ing profits, interest rates, industry capacity and investment income ratio. According
to Balke and Fomby (1997), a threshold cointegration has to be considered as a two-
step approach. The null of no cointegration has to be rejected first by using the
Engle–Granger linear cointegration test, a test of whether threshold behaviour is pre-
sent, then proceed. Although improvements have been made to construct jointly a
test for non-linearity and cointegration (e.g., Enders & Siklos, 2001; Li & Lee, 2010),
we still utilise the bounds test for cointegration provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) to
ensure our argument is more robust and convincing. This testing procedure, irre-
spective of the order of the underlying variables, provides profound flexibility for
studying underwriting activity in the insurance industry because the loss ratio is usu-
ally assumed to be stationary (e.g., Choi et al., 2002; Harrington & Yu, 2003). Unlike
other cointegration techniques which require certain pre-testing for unit roots as well
as underlying variables to be integrated of order one, this bounds testing procedure
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provides an alternative test for examining the long-term relationship, thus could
reduce the degree of uncertainty arising from the pre-testing stage of each series in
the analysis of levels relations. Moreover, the bounds test is still valid in small sam-
ples and can be reliably used to estimate and to test the cointegration relationship,
and thus is very suitable in the insurance context (e.g., Jiang & Nieh, 2012; Tian,
Jiang, Pan, & Zhang, 2018).
Once the null that there is no level relationship is rejected by the bounds testing pro-
cedure, the ADL test for the threshold cointegration technique advanced by Li and Lee
(2010) will proceed in this article. This test relaxes the assumption of a pre-specified
cointegrating vector and considers estimating the cointegrating vector. Therefore, it is
suitable to conduct this technique as there is no economic information to obtain a pre-
viously known cointegration vector. This test is also free of nuisance parameters, thus a
bootstrap procedure is not required, and critical values of the proposed tests are tabu-
lated by Li and Lee (2010). Similar to the bounds testing procedure, the ADL test for
threshold cointegration is undertaken as a single-equation conditional model which
requires the condition of weak exogeneity. Such an assumption is intuitively reasonable
because the underwriting activity of the non-life insurance industry has few impacts on
the macroeconomic system (e.g., movement of interest rates). Also, the current capacity,
which is calculated by using non-life insurance companies’ surplus at the end of previ-
ous calendar year, should not be explained by the current underwriting profits (Jiang &
Nieh, 2012). The representation of a single-equation conditional model allows contem-
poraneous innovations and only a unique error correction term will be present, which
avoids confusion from having multiple cointegration vectors.
Consider the indicators with It ¼ Iðut1<ut1ðsÞÞ, the threshold ADL regression
model of insurance underwriting activities is described as follows:
Dyt ¼ b0 þ b1yt1It þ b2yt1ð1ItÞ þ b3rt1It þ b4rt1ð1ItÞ þ b5ct1It
þb6ct1ð1ItÞ þ b7IIRt1It þ b8IIRt1ð1ItÞ þ b9Drt þ b10Dct þ b11DIIRt þ et (2)
where et is the residual, and It ¼ 1 if the error correction term ut1<ut1ðsÞ and It ¼
0 otherwise. The threshold value, denoted by ut1ðsÞ, is given by the s th percentile
of the empirical distribution of ut1. Most important, the adjustment speeds towards
the long-run equilibrium as measured by bi (i ¼ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) are allowed to
vary in the threshold model. Thus, the conventional ADL model is a special case of
the threshold ADL model when b1 ¼ b2, b3 ¼ b4, b5 ¼ b6 and b7 ¼ b8. Li and Lee
(2010) recommend a BO-type test (Boswijk, 1994) for threshold cointegration, that is,
jointly testing the coefficients of yt1, rt1, ct1 and IIRt under the null of no thresh-
old cointegration.
The threshold cointegration specification allows us to uncover potential non-linear-
ities and asymmetries in the adjustment of underwriting activities and provide more
information regarding the dynamics of underwriting cycles. Notice that Equation (2) is
based on the second autoregressive model (i.e., AR(2)). If the threshold model is based
on AR(1), there will be no lagged changes terms (i.e., t – 1) in Equation (2). In this
study, we shall test the data-generating process for both AR(1) and AR(2) settings in
this two-regime threshold model. It is conceivable that error correction may occur in
one regime only, or that error correction occurs in both regimes but at different speeds
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of adjustment. In the case of the insurance underwriting activity, one might expect
asymmetric adjustment if insurance companies behave asymmetrically in response to the
periods of soft market and hard market. We hypothesise that if underwriting profits are
far beyond expectation (i.e.,ut1  ut1ðsÞ), there would be a different adjustment
mechanism to portray the belief of insurance companies.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Bounds test
The main objective of this research is to investigate the dynamics of insurance com-
panies’ underwriting activities and their behaviour. In order to make our results more
general and convincing, this study first tests the absence of any level relationships
between underwriting profits and their determinants. The existence of a level rela-
tionship is the basis of subsequent analyses in this article. According to
Assenmacher-Wesche and Pesaran (2008), the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)
modelling approach is robust to the unit root properties of the underlying series and
can be conducted as a preliminary analysis of the long-run relationships between
groups of variables separately before embarking on the full system estimation.
Therefore, in this paper a bounds testing procedure of the ARDL approach is con-
ducted to test null hypotheses of no level relationships, irrespective of whether the
variables are I(0) or I(1). As mentioned above, the autoregressive process is tradition-
ally constructed to portray the dynamics of underwriting profits, such as the AR(1)
process (e.g., Winter, 1994) or the AR(2) process (e.g., Cummins & Outreville, 1987).
This article imposes the order of lag length from one to two and calculates the F-stat-
istic and t-statistic. According to Pesaran et al. (2001), the asymptotic distributions of
the F-statistic and t-statistic are non-standard, and are much higher than the standard
ones. The bounds testing procedure has two sets of asymptotic critical values. One set
assumes all variables are I(0) and the other assumes that all variables are I(1). If the
computed F-statistic and t-statistic fall above the upper limit of the bound critical
value, then the null hypothesis is rejected. Conversely, if the computed F-statistic and
t-statistic fall below the lower bound critical value, then the null cannot be rejected.
Finally, the case within the bounds of critical value is inconclusive.
Table 2 shows that the null hypothesis maintaining non-existence of the level rela-
tionship is rejected for both the whole insurance industry and the general liability insur-
ance as the order of lags reaches one or two, irrespective of whether the underlying
variables are I(0) or I(1). The results demonstrate that models are appropriate for both
the restricted intercept and unrestricted intercept cases.6 Furthermore, it is important to
note that the critical values based on larger sample size (i.e., Pesaran et al., 2001) may
deviate significantly from those of a small sample size (i.e., Narayan, 2004, 2005). In
order to check the robustness of the testing results, we conducted an additional testing
procedure by using critical values from Narayan (2005), which were generated for a
small sample size ranging from 30 to 80 observations. The critical value bounds we used
were based on two exogenous variables and 60 observations,7 and the null hypothesis
maintaining non-existence of the level relationship was still rejected at the 5% significant
level for both insurance lines when the order of lags reached one or two. Based on these
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results from the bounds test, the econometric specification that there is a level relation-
ship between underwriting profits, interest rates and the industry capacity is valid as the
basis of the ensuing threshold cointegration analysis.
4.2. ADL test for threshold cointegration
After a long-run relationship has been validated, we can estimate a threshold error
correction model. In this section, the ADL test for the threshold cointegration test
and its estimations advanced by Li and Lee (2010) is introduced. The study focuses
here on the threshold ADL model with two regimes differentiated by a threshold
effect in the error correction term. We are particularly interested in variations of
insurance companies’ underwriting policies, especially in the regime where the under-
writing profits move too far from the equilibrium. The data-generating processes of
both AR(1) and AR(2) are shown in Tables 3 and 4. Based on the BO-type test
results, we find that the null hypothesis of no threshold cointegration is rejected for
both the whole insurance industry and the general liability insurance. Apparently, the
ADL test for threshold cointegration employed in this study provides strong evidence
favouring the long-run validity in which the adjustment process towards its equilib-
rium is asymmetric. Therefore, we could define two regimes of underwriting activ-
ities, which may be related to soft/hard markets in the insurance world. For instance,
as underwriting profits are measured by combined ratios with the data-generating
process AR(1), the first regime (with 63.9% of the observations for the whole insur-
ance industry and with 83.6% for the general liability insurance) has moderate speed
of adjustment and could be labelled as the ‘typical’ regime. On the contrary, when
the underwriting profits move too far from equilibrium, the second regime (with
36.1% of the observations for the whole insurance industry and with 16.4% for the
general liability insurance) has a sharply fast speed of adjustment and could be
labelled as the ‘unusual’ regime.
Table 2. Bounds test statistics.





Whole insurance industry 1 5.6464 9.4122 4.2464
2 4.9911 6.2086 4.0249
General liability insurance 1 4.7462 4.7872 3.1486
2 4.4868 5.6059 3.8613
B Combined ratio
Whole insurance industry 1 4.7714 5.9117 3.1973
2 3.9450 4.8048 3.4830
General liability insurance 1 3.9603 4.9491 3.2700
2 4.4263 5.5279 3.9395
Notes: , Significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
Source: authors’ calculations.
For the restricted intercept case, critical value bounds of F-statistics is (2.63, 3.35) at the 10% level and (3.10, 3.87)
at the 5% level.
For the unrestricted intercept case, critical value bounds of F-statistics is (3.17, 4.14) at the 10% level and (3.79,
4.85) at the 5% level. Critical value bounds of t-statistics is (2.57, 3.21) at the 10% level and (2.86, 3.53) at
the 5% level.
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As shown in Tables 3 and 4, significant negative coefficients of lagged underwriting
profits reinforce the equilibrium of underwriting activity dynamics in both regimes. The
short-term effect, represented by current changes or lagged changes of variables, seems to
be relatively small due to their insignificant coefficients. Therefore, the error correction
Table 3. The ADL test for threshold cointegration: loss ratio.
Whole insurance industry General liability insurance
AR(1) AR(2) AR(1) AR(2)
Constant 23.2718 （2.0431) 48.4013 (3.0844) 4.7631 (0.4857) 5.0358 （0.4754)
yt1It 0.4082 (2.2062) 0.7875 (3.1691) 0.2561 (1.8387) 0.3181 (2.0796)
yt1ð1ItÞ 0.5688 (3.2793) 0.9506 (4.1011) 0.7289 (2.8659) 0.7343 (2.6361)
rt1It 0.2832 (0.9847) 0.1791 (0.5290) 1.6339 (2.5936) 1.7304 (2.2139)
rt1ð1ItÞ 1.7219 (3.6461) 1.6433 (3.4171) 4.1334 (2.9850) 4.3595 (2.6070)
ct1It 1.9335 (0.5998) 4.5864 (1.1638) 2.7084 (0.4624) 3.8528 (0.5756)
ct1ð1ItÞ 7.7601 (2.0449) 5.0418 (1.3800) 53.3721 (3.2671) 50.8891 (2.8253)
IIRt1It 0.1843 (0.4118) 0.8740 (1.6680) 0.5399 (0.2687) 0.5448 (0. 2793)
IIRt1ð1ItÞ 0.6305 (1.4623) 1.4582 (2.6828) 0.5814 (0.8521) 0.9114 (1.2232)
Drt 0.1781 (0.4612) 0.2510 (0.6193) 0.2242 (0.2402) 0.4218 (0.4147)
Dct 5.3038 (0.7291) 4.1839 (0.5753) 10.7962 (0.7953) 9.2346 (0.6010)
DIIRt 0.7912 (0.9782) 0.9377 (1.1859) 2.3671 (1.2917) 1.2257 (0.5915)
Dyt1 0.3084 (1.9236) 0.1379 (0.9576)
Drt1 0.3390 (0.7672) 0.0924 (0.0860)
Dct1 2.3350 (0.3790) 12.6418 (0.9036)
DIIRt1 1.3011 (1.3344) 1.1481 (0.5615)
BOstat. 48.979 44.213 36.595 30.460
s 0.620 0.650 0.805 0.773
AIC 402.325 373.288 479.432 476.541
Note: Significant at the 0.05 level.
Source: authors’ calculations.
2. The critical values of the BO test is 24.67 at the 0.05 level.
3. t-Statistics are estimated using Eicker–White standard errors, reported in parentheses.
Table 4. The ADL test for threshold cointegration: combined ratio.
Whole insurance industry General liability insurance
AR(1) AR(2) AR(1) AR(2)
Constant 40.3854 (2.2399) 75.1319 (3.5866) 19.7436 (1.2746) 33.8011 (2.0192)
yt1It 0.4679 (2.5282) 0.7893 (3.5649) 0.3324 (2.1757) 0.4635 (2.5994)
yt1ð1ItÞ 0.5748 (3.1123) 0.9201 (4.1999) 0.9346 (3.5458) 0.6842 (3.9076)
rt1It 0.3335 (1.0887) 0.1875 (0.5453) 1.5254 (2.2308) 1.1814 (1.2583)
rt1ð1ItÞ 1.8595 (4.1574) 1.8972 (4.0964) 5.5958 (3.1626) 2.9593 (2.8072)
ct1It 1.3343 (0.4487) 5.1884 (1.5473) 4.6129 (0.8104) 0.4424 (0.0586)
ct1ð1ItÞ 9.4016 (2.5332) 1.8972 (4.0964) 63.5788 (2.9788) 25.7003 (2.3273)
IIRt1It 0.0317 (0.0892) 0.1407 (0.3715) 0.4920 (0.8633) 0.9939 (1.4451)
IIRt1ð1ItÞ 0.4599 (1.4311) 0.8650 (2.1403) 1.6689 (0.9870) 2.7847 (1.6448)
Drt 0.0404 (0.0957) 0.2139 (0.5319) 0.3674 (0.3759) 0.8605 (0.8416)
Dct 0.5946 (0.0862) 10.9264 (1.5453) 11.5339 (0.8108) 8.3631 (0.5311)
DIIRt 0.2843 (0.3290) 0.7710 (0.9354) 1.3519 (0.6719) 0.4923 (0.2430)
Dyt1 0.3692 (2.4317) 0.2221 (1.5368)
Drt1 0.1550 (0.3601) 0.7988 (0.7114)
Dct1 4.6677 (0.8040) 4.3493 (0.2985)
DIIRt1 1.1417 (1.2337) 0.9270 (0.4098)
BOstat. 38.666 39.465 31.362 26.750
s 0.639 0.652 0.836 0.717
AIC 394.701 399.062 496.595 483.412
Note: Significant at the 0.05 level.
Source: authors’ calculations.
The critical value of the BO test is 24.67 at the 0.05 level.
t-Statistics are estimated using Eicker–White standard errors, reported in parentheses.
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from the equilibrium seems to be the main effect of dynamics of underwriting profits,
which makes it move more like a cycle. The dynamics of underwriting profits being cyc-
lical may not necessarily mean that it will return to a given level of the past, and can
occur around a long-term trend in profitability and availability of insurance. A visible
cyclical pattern of underwriting profits could be explained as a feedback tendency to the
equilibrium, rather than modelling as an AR(2) process with cyclical pattern assumptions.
Moreover, all models reveal a significant positive long-run level relationship between
underwriting profits, interest rates and investment income ratio. The effect of interest
rates and investment income ratio on the general liability insurance is generally larger
than for the whole industry because of its long-tail characteristic. Such an empirical result
reveals that the longer the tail, the greater the portion of investable funds that can be
acquired, thus a greater sensitivity of interest rates on underwriting profits displays.
The effect of industry capacity is significantly positive in general for an unusual
regime, which is consistent with Berger (1988), that is, insurance companies decide their
price and quantity of supply depending on their current capacity. The more industry
capacity, the more supply of insurance makes higher underwriting profits (i.e., higher
loss ratios and higher combined ratios). Similarly, the effect of industry capacity on the
general liability insurance is much larger than the whole industry, especially during the
period of unusual regime. In order to analyse both regimes, threshold error correction
models from the level relationship of underwriting activities can be re-parametrised
from estimated coefficients in Tables 3 and 4. For illustration purpose only, we take the
case of combined ratio with AR(1) data-generating process as examples:8
I. Whole insurance industry:
Dyt ¼ 40:38540:4679ðyt10:7103rt12:8596ct10:0757IIRt1Þ typical regime
¼ 40:38540:5748ðyt13:2486rt116:3622ct10:8015IIRt1Þ unusual regime
II. General liability insurance:
Dyt ¼ 19:74360:3324ðyt14:5890rt113:8776ct11:4801IIRt1Þ typical regime
¼ 19:74360:9346ðyt15:9873rt168:0278ct11:7943IIRt1Þ unusual regime
As shown above, there are two different regimes to portray underwriting activities of
insurance companies with an adjustment above the estimated threshold much sharper
than below it. Both regimes reflect different beliefs of the underwriting policy
depending on different deviations from the equilibrium. In the typical regime, posi-
tive effects of interest rate, investment income ratio and insurance industry capacity
on underwriting profits are moderate in terms of the magnitudes of the coefficients
for both the whole insurance industry and the general liability insurance. In the
unusual regime, a strikingly different story emerges that there is a stronger tendency
to move towards a new equilibrium in which positive effects of interest rates, invest-
ment income ratio and the insurance industry capacity are much larger than in the
typical regime. For instance, the magnitude of the capacity coefficient for the whole
insurance industry in the unusual regime (16.3622) is almost six times larger than it
is in the typical regime (2.8596). The magnitude of the interest rates coefficient for
the whole insurance industry in the unusual regime (3.2486) is more than four times
larger than it is in the typical regime (0.7103). The general liability insurance also has
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a similar phenomenon as the whole insurance industry. Such results indicate that
when the underwriting result moves too far from expectations, the underwriting pol-
icy becomes more aggressive to allow more risk in the next period. Compared with
the typical regime, positive effects on investment income ratio, capacity and interest
rates sharply increasing in the unusual regime imply companies may be overconfident
in believing that in the next period their capacity could afford more risk and could
generate more return on the investment side. In this paper, we provide an economet-
ric foundation about soft markets perhaps being one of the causes of aggressive pric-
ing or understating loss reserves, which is similar with the findings of previous
literature (e.g., Li & Nielson, 2015; Malinovskii, 2014; Ruml, 2018).
Based on empirical evidence, we may consider the possibility of the existence of over-
confidence among insurance practitioners. Overconfidence is associated with the over-
estimation of the quality and precision of information about forecasting, with
underestimation of both the volatility due to uncertainty and the probability that
unfavourable events will occur. It attracts abundant attention in the academic literature,
such as overreaction of investors (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Surahmanyam, 1998) and
bubbles of asset price (e.g., Sheinkman & Xiong, 2003); however, it is surprising that
insurance is often ignored in this context. In the insurance world, pricing uncertainty
and hence variability of supply are built into the very nature of insurance. Insurance
companies have to use projection techniques to forecast and estimate ultimate losses in
order to price and reserve appropriately, thus may induce possible overconfidence.
McGee (1986) first argues that insurance companies may differ as to their future expect-
ations concerning losses. A company with optimistic loss forecasts may cause insurance
prices to fall below the level implied by industry average forecasts. Furthermore, evi-
dence of excessive insurance price cutting in soft markets was seen in the general liabil-
ity insurance during the early 1980s (Harrington & Danzon, 1994) and for medical
malpractice insurance during the 1990s (Harrington et al., 2008). From practitioners’
view, Conger and Lowe (2003) note that insurance mispricing decisions are subject to
actuaries’ and underwriters’ overconfidence, which comes from not knowing the limits
of their knowledge. Ligon and Thistle (2007) suggest insurance companies are overconfi-
dent to overweight their private information, and then predict the insurance profits
change will be asymmetrical. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to pro-
vide empirical evidence supporting the asymmetric adjustment of insurance profits.
Moreover, the negative coefficient of lagged underwriting profits represents the
speed back to long-term equilibrium. The correction speed for the whole insurance
industry in the unusual regime (–0.5748) is slightly faster than it is in the typical
regime (–0.4679). As for general liability insurance, it indicates a slow adjustment to
long-term equilibrium in the typical regime (–0.3324), whereas in the unusual regime
the correction is almost three times faster (0.9346). These findings exhibit that, in
the unusual regime, the error correction terms respond much more noticeably to a
new equilibrium, a more aggressive underwriting policy that reflects a more optimis-
tic belief of insurance companies. To sum up, empirical evidence of this study pro-
vides that once the underwriting result turns bad (i.e., moves too far from the
expectation), insurance companies will engage a more excessive risk-taking strategy
for the upcoming period.
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5. Concluding remarks
The investigation of speculative behaviour in insurance markets, compared with
equity markets, is still underdeveloped in the literature. By taking into account asym-
metries in departures from the long-run equilibrium relationship, the ADL test for
the threshold cointegration approach is designed to capture empirically the character-
istics of cycles in insurance markets. The results are in line with the prediction of
Ligon and Thistle (2007) in which the underwriting profits should be cyclical and
change asymmetrically. Possible explanations of asymmetric adjustments are that
insurance companies may not have the same degree of information perception and
their expectations may be heterogeneous. Consequently, the interaction between these
different insurance companies can imply delays and asymmetries in loss ratio/com-
bined ratio adjustment and introduce a visualised cycle in the insurance market. A
limitation of the current study is that the impact from global reinsurance markets,
which may also be subject to cyclical dynamics (Cummins, 2005; Cummins & Weiss,
2009), has not yet been considered in this context. It would be interesting to extend
the analysis in the hope of capturing indirect links between primary insurers’ under-
writing activities and reinsurers’ strategies. We leave this to future research.
In the current study, the threshold behaviour of the U.S. insurance market has
been evidenced, that is, positive impacts of interest rates, investment income and
insurance capacity in the unusual regime are more pronounced than those in the typ-
ical regime, due to their significantly larger coefficients in the unusual regime. The
decreasing insurance profits induce risk-seeking herding behaviour to attain higher
profits, thus boosting speculation. Generally, during the period of unusual regime,
investment income has relatively weaker and insignificant effects on insurance profits,
which is consistent with the findings that investment income is weakly related to
underwriting gain or loss (Ellis, 1990) and has no significant impacts on underwriting
risk (Zou et al., 2012). Such a result provides some useful insights that the insurance
industry may have overlooked the correlation between underwriting and investment
activities and may have largely conducted investment strategy in isolation from
underwriting, which can lead to the assumption of excessive risk relating to the same
source (Achleitner, Biebel, & Wichels, 2002). Based on these findings, monitoring of
both underwriting and investment decisions is necessary. Insurance companies should
adopt an integrated approach of underwriting with consideration of investment poli-
cies, and should enhance the ability to counterbalance volatile underwriting results
through the steering of investment income in order to alleviate the threshold behav-
iour of insurance companies.
This study has provided several implications for insurance practitioners and regu-
lators. First, to gain a competitive hold in a soft market by cutting prices or relaxing
underwriting criteria is indeed a gamble. It might make insurance companies appear
profitable in the short term but cause greater loss exposures and have to pay more
claims in the future, especially for general liability insurance. Therefore, to prevent
aggressive risky decisions, insurance companies need to build up their own ADL
threshold model to monitor their own underwriting policy. During a period of
unusual regime, insurance companies should be more conservative and should be
willing to sustain a possible loss of market share by exercising underwriting
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discipline. Second, according to Pesaran and Smith (2016) the autoregressive distrib-
uted lag modelling can reduce forecast uncertainty and is useful for conducting coun-
terfactual analysis. Therefore, insurance companies could evaluate the effectiveness of
their policies, such as pricing decisions, investment and underwriting policies, or cap-
ital allocation strategies, by using their own autoregressive distributed lag specifica-
tions. Third, the government should maintain disciplined underwriting policies of
insurance companies for improving the economic efficiency of insurance supply and
avoiding irrational pricing strategies. To prevent destructive competition, regulators
are responsible for determining whether the insurance prices and insurance compa-
nies’ capacity are adequate as well as taking into account the macroeconomic indica-
tors to determine the stage of underwriting cycle. Fourth, more than 100% combined
ratio is traditionally used as an indicator for a soft market (Bruneau & Sghaier, 2015).
The ADL threshold model in this study, by contrast, provides an objective indicator
for unusual underwriting activities and could be utilised as an early warning predictor
of the next round of soft market. Finally, insurance companies should determine
underwriting strategies and pricing decisions based on their own financial status. As
the underwriting result turns bad, it would be advisable to utilise risk-financing tools,
such as reinsurance or alternative risk transfer products, in order to avoid systemic
risky behaviour.
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Notes
1. The underwriting profits at time t, yt , could be expressed as: yt ¼ a0 þ a1yt1 þ a2yt2 þ
et with cyclical assumptions: a1>0, a2<0, and a12 þ 4a2<0.
2. The rational expectations/institutional intervention model (Cummins & Outreville, 1987)
provides an AR(2) process. Winter’s (1994) capacity constraint model implies an AR(1)
process. Higgins and Thistle (2000) report an AR(1) process when capacity is high and
AR(2) process when capacity is low. See Harrington, Niehaus, & Yu (2013) for a review.
3. In the U.S., the combined ratio is the sum of loss ratio and expense ratio. The loss ratio
is the ratio of loss and loss adjustment expense incurred to earned premium in a
calendar year. The expense ratio is the ratio of unallocated expense to written premium
in a calendar year.
4. In this study, the general liability insurance includes medical malpractice insurance,
products liability insurance, and all other commercial liability insurance except auto
liability insurance.
5. According to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ regulatory test in the
U.S., a Kenney ratio greater than three is considered unfavourable.
6. There are two cases of intercept. One is restricted intercept and the other is unrestricted
intercept. See Pesaran et al. (2001).
7. For the restricted intercept case, critical value bounds of F-statistics is (3.288, 4.070) at
the 5% level. For the unrestricted intercept case, critical value bounds of F-statistics is
(4.000, 5.057) at the 5% level. See Narayan (2005).
8. All the other three cases have similar implications as this case.
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